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Abstract: 
  
The recent global financial crisis has once again shown how fragile the financial system is. This 
essay investigates the credit risk in the Nordic banking sector by measuring the probability of 
default of the six major Nordic banks. This is done by using the Merton (1974) model which 
utilizes stock prices as well as balance sheet data. The results are compared with an approach first 
suggested by Hall and Miles (1990) which relies solely on stock market prices. In order to 
highlight the risk of a highly concentrated banking sector, the essay also investigates the spillover 
effects from one bank to another. The essay follows the example of Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) that have developed the commonly used VaR into CoVaR, a risk measure that takes 
systemic risk into account.   
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1. Introduction  
Banks and other financial institutions are an important part of the foundation of a well-
functioning modern economy. Still, the global financial crisis proved that these institutions are 
particularly vulnerable and exposed to contagiousness. Economic crises are often the result of 
complex circumstances, however for the global financial crisis it is safe to say that the credit risk 
of financial institutions played a key role. 
The overall aim of this essay is to investigate the health of the largest Nordic banks. This will be 
done by examining their credit risks and risk linkages. While the whole Nordic banking sector 
may be considered as relatively stable, the Swedes can still recall when Swedbank almost 
collapsed in 2008. Also, both Norway and Sweden experienced severe banking crises in the 
beginning  of  the  1990’s. This record of instability and the structure of the Nordic banking sector 
with a few, all connected, large players are the motivations for this essay. But in fact, the natural 
structure of low equity compared to leverage ratio makes all banks important to monitor closely. 
The first part of this essay investigates the individual credit risks of the largest Nordic 
commercial banks by first using the cornerstone of the structural models of credit risk; the 
Merton model developed by Robert C. Merton (1974). The model is used to evaluate the credit 
risk  of  a  company’s  debt.  Simplified,  the  model  accounts  for  when  a  failure  will  occur  by  looking  
at   the   value   of   a   company’s   assets   compared to its liabilities. The likelihood of this failure, 
commonly referred to as the probability of default, is based on the assets and the capital structure 
of a company. While the essay will rely on the structural approach for assessing credit risk, we 
control and compare our results from the Merton model by also calculating the probability of 
default with a model originally suggested by Hall and Miles (1990). This approach was 
developed and applied to banks specifically and relies solely on market information. We include 
2005Q1-2013Q4 in our calculations to cover the periods pre-, during and post the global financial 
crisis. Our aim of this part is to, in terms of probability of default, demonstrate how the banks 
performed during these periods. The results will show how each bank was affected during 
distress and also look at the more recent performance in order to obtain an indication  of  the  banks’  
more current health status.   
 
4 
 
The second and last part of the essay serves as a complement to the first part and investigates the 
risk linkages between the same largest Nordic commercial banks. The structure of a banking 
sector is often heavily interlinked and the Nordic sector is not an exception. As a matter of fact, 
according   to   the   “Nordic   regional   report”   (2013)   from   the International Monetary Fund, the 
strong linkages between the Nordic banks is one of the most concerning weaknesses of the 
Nordic banking sector. To investigate these risk linkages we have chosen a model for systemic 
risk developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). They suggest a measure called CoVaR, an 
extension of the widely used risk measure value at risk which they use to assess the risk 
contribution from U.S financial institutions to the system. In order to be able to investigate the 
above mentioned weakness of the Nordic banking sector, we will use CoVaR in a slightly 
modified way and look at the risk contribution from one bank to another. Also this model is 
based on market information. Our aim with this part of the essay is to complement the first part - 
We aim to give a fuller picture of the formerly and current health status of the individual banks 
by searching for differences in vulnerability in terms of risk linkages.  
We believe our contribution with this essay is the attempt to give a fuller picture of the health of 
the individual banks. The most obvious limitation of this essay is that it does not explain the 
underlying mechanisms of the results of credit risk and risk linkages. Also, there is evidently 
criticism against the used models which we will account for below and we will critically review 
our results. For instance, Vassalou and Xing (2008) propose that the probability of default should 
not be interpreted literally and this limits the results to only reflect a relative ranking. With 
regards to our attempt to contribute with a fuller picture of the health status, we are limited by the 
fact that the models for credit risk are not combinable with the model for risk linkages. Thus we 
are not able to provide a combined measure for each bank, which would have given a more 
comprehensive picture. 
 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows; section 2 briefly summarizes the Nordic 
banking sector and its vulnerabilities, section 3 presents relevant literature on credit risk, section 
4 is the method section reviewing the used credit risk models, section 5 clarifies the data used and 
section 6 presents the result. With section 7 the second part of the essay begins with a literature 
review on systemic risk, section 8 explains the chosen method and section 9 and 10 presents data 
and result, respectively. Lastly, section 11 summarizes and concludes both parts of the essay. 
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CREDIT RISK 
 
2. The Nordic banking system and its vulnerabilities  
 
This section will give an overview of the structure of the Nordic banking sector, present the 
banks included in our calculations and also establish a sense of what weaknesses that may 
threaten the stability of the sector. The following is a very brief and simplified version of the 
banks’  structures  as  these  are  very  complex. 
What characterizes the Nordic banking market is the predominance of a small number of 
relatively large banks. These banks are Nordea, Swedbank, Handelsbanken, Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken (SEB), Danske Bank and DNB. The four first mentioned banks have their 
headquarters in Sweden and the other two in Denmark and Norway respectively. Furthermore, in 
addition to the relative size of these six financial institutions compared to their competitors, they 
are   in   most   cases   also   large   relative   to   GDP.   In   “Nordic   Regional   Report”   (2013)   the  
International  Monetary   Fund   has   analyzed   the   banks’   balance   sheets   and   found   that   these   six  
banks account for 90 percent of the assets of all publicly listed Nordic banks and that the size of 
their assets are worth 185 percent of the Nordic GDP. In addition, the largest banks in each home 
country, Nordea, DNB and Danske Bank represent 30 percent of the Nordic GDP. 
According   to   the   report   “The   Swedish   Financial  Market”   (2013)   from   Sveriges Riksbank, the 
four Swedish banks have almost half of its lending to customers abroad. As a major player also 
outside its home market, Nordea has 75% of its lending outside Sweden but mainly to Nordic 
customers. The other three banks have their largest lending within Sweden with on average a 
quarter to the other Nordic countries. A notable part of Swedbank’s and  SEB’s  lending  is  devoted  
to the Baltic countries. SEB is also growing in Germany while Handelsbanken is currently taking 
market share in United Kingdom. In   Norway,   Norges   Bank   reports   in   “Financial Stability 
Report”   (2013)   that   the largest Norwegian bank, DNB, accounts for 30 percent of the total 
lending in Norway and the bank operates mainly on its home market. In the full rating report 
“Danske   Bank   AS”   (December   2013)   from   Fitch   Ratings,   it   is stated that Danske Bank is 
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Denmark’s   leading   bank  with   30%   of   the  Danish   deposits   and   lending   and   has   5-10% of the 
market share in the other Nordic countries. The bank also operates in the Baltics and Ireland. 
 
All banks except DNB and Handelsbanken have expanded in the Baltic countries, and according 
to  the  “Annual  Report”  (2013)  from  Swedbank,  their dominance is most notable in Estonia where 
they together control around 90 percent of the market. Swedbank is the bank with the largest 
customer base in the Baltics. With 4,0 million customers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
combined, the Baltic customer base is as large as the original home market of Sweden, with 4,1 
million customers. In “Myndigheternas insatser för   finansiell   stabilitet“   (2011), Riksrevisionen 
reports that in 2007, the operations in the Baltics made up almost a third of the EBIT of 
Swedbank and almost a fifth of SEB. For Nordea, the proportion rose to 3 percent at the most, in 
2008. The report also concludes that the banks increased their risk exposure by expanding in the 
Baltic countries. The Baltic economies grew uncontrollably and as a result they faced growing 
imbalances. For instance, the credit expansion was extreme with increased lending volumes of 
40-70 percent a year during 2005-2007 in these countries. 
 
The Nordic banks are as all banks sensitive to exogenous shocks. In  the  “Nordic  Region  Report” 
(2013), IMF summarizes that for the Nordic region, the indebted households together with the 
increasing prices on the housing market compose a challenge for the stability. However, due to 
the   “deeply   integrated   banking   system” (p. 11), the banks within the region are especially 
vulnerable because of the imminent risk of transmission. The banks have widespread cross-
border operations and IMF suggests that they   “operate   more   as   regional   banks   rather   than  
national   banks”   (p.   11). Hence, the interlinkages caused by the banks operating regionally, 
threatens to intensify eventual shocks. Regulations such as the Basel regulation with equity 
capital requirement, are mainly focused on the individual bank. However, Elsinger et al. (2006) 
warn that focusing on bank stability on an individual level is not sufficient in the event of an 
extreme shock as correlations in bank portfolios and credit interlinkages can alter the shock and 
cause a domino effect. Specifically for the Nordics, Blåvarg and Nimander (2002) advise that in a 
concentrated systems as the Nordic banking system, one can expect a more concentrated 
interbank market with stronger credit interlinkages and undiversified risk. 
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In  the  “Financial  Stability  Report”  (2013)  from  Norges  Bank,  it  is  reported  that  The Nordic loan-
to-deposit ratios are twice as high as the average of European banks and IMF reports in the 
“Nordic  Regional  Report”   (2013)   that for example Danske Bank and Swedbank are looking at 
LTD ratios of 220 percent. To fund the great banking sector, there is a need to turn to external 
funding; the banks rely extensively on wholesale funding.  As widely argued, and especially after 
the global financial crisis and the fall of Lehman Brothers, a heavy reliance on wholesale funding 
increases the vulnerability of a bank. 
3. Literature review - Credit risk 
Robert   C.  Merton’s   paper   “On   the   pricing   of   Corporate   Debt:   The   Risk   Structure   of   Interest  
Rates”  (1974)  extended the Black-Scholes model (1973) and presented a model for evaluating the 
credit risk of a company. With the model being based on a new theory, it became the foundation 
of a new class of models for credit risks; the structural, or asset value models. Other literature on 
credit risk is for example based on static models such as accounting models. However, this kind 
of models has been criticized by for example Vassalou and Xing (2004) as backward looking as 
they do not reflect market expectations. Byström (2003) also criticizes possible accounting 
manipulations and the obvious time lag. The Merton model assumes that a firm’s   debt   can   be  
seen as a zero-coupon bond that matures at time T and if the assets at this time T are less than the 
debt, the firm will default. The inputs needed for the model are the asset value, its volatility and 
the debt of a company – A higher standard deviation of the asset value fluctuations contributes to 
a higher likelihood of default and an increase on capital to debt ratio contributes to a lower 
likelihood of default. To clarify, for a bank, the debt can be thought of as mainly deposits.  
 
The Merton model has been extensively used for examining the credit risk for companies but it 
has also been extended and modified in numerous ways. Tudela and Young (2005) refer to the 
extended models that for example add other financial  data  to  original  Merton  approach  as  “hybrid  
approaches”.  One  of  the  most  widely  known  hybrid  approaches  is  the  commercial  KMV’s  default  
risk model, which framework is summarized by Crosbie and Bohn (2002). While it relies on the 
Merton  model’s  structure  of  forecasting  the  probability  of  default  it  distinguish  itself  by  applying  
an empirical distribution of U.S companies’  defaults on the asset value fluctuations instead of the 
originally assumed normal distribution. Also other parts of the model are refined. For instance, 
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debt is defined as all short-term liabilities plus half the book value of all long term debts and the 
standard deviation of the asset returns is estimated from historical data but also through an 
applied iterative procedure. Tudela and Young (2005) show that the Merton model provides 
useful and reliable information. They apply the model to UK public companies and with different 
techniques such as comparing the results to actual default records, other default models and 
various statistical measures including power curves and accuracy ratios, they find that the default 
probability   obtained   from   using   the   Merton   model   is   a   “strong   signal of failure one year in 
advance  of  its  occurrence”. 
Credit risk models are mainly used by financial institutions and investors to evaluate the credit 
risk of a company. However, alike in this essay, they may also be applied to investigate the health 
of a financial institution itself. Allen and Powell (2010) use the Merton model along with other 
measures such as VaR to investigate the default probability of Australian banks before and during 
the global financial crisis. They find that while a raised ranking of the major Australian banks 
was somewhat accurate relative to their peers, all the banks did experience a significant increase 
in the probability of default during the financial crisis.  
 
Byström (2003) finds that the financial   institutions’   “high   leverage ratio and opaque balance 
sheets”  (p. 2) may affect the results from the Merton model to be misleading. In other words, the 
probability of default produced in the Merton model will be less sensitive to a change in the 
leverage ratio for a highly leveraged company such as a bank. In addition to this sector specific 
issue, the author also problematizes the fact that the extended KMV model has substituted the 
assumed normal distribution with a non-public database of default statistics and therefore the 
model cannot be used by the broad public to assess credit risk with the same accuracy. To 
investigate  the  Swedish  banks’  performance  during  the  90’s crisis he instead relies on a structural, 
purely market based approach developed by Hall and Miles (1990). The author compares his 
results with one of the most known credit rating agencies and concludes that even if it is 
problematic to estimate the preciseness of default probabilities, they surely seem to capture and 
evaluate changes faster and to a wider extent than the credit ratings. With this market based 
approach Hall and Miles (1990) aimed to develop a new technique for assessing the credit risk of 
institutions’   portfolios.   The  model   is   based on ”share   prices   with   time   varying   risk   premia   to  
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analyze market perceptions  of  volatility”  (p.1) and looks at the measure 1/σக౪   in order to assess a 
probability of default to a financial institution. As Clare and Priestly (2002) mentions, while the 
measure may be compared to those developed by Santomero and Vinso (1977) and Hannan and 
Hanweck (1988), it is unique in its way that is gives a forecasting measure by employing stock 
prices. With forward looking default probabilities one is given indications of where intervention 
or change in regulation may be needed. Hall and Miles (1990) themselves applied their method to 
four at the time relatively stable UK banks. With the aim to develop a technique for forecasting 
default probability the validity of the method was rather difficult to estimate when no banks were 
in trouble. In addition to Byström (2003) confirming the method, Clare and Priestly (2002) apply 
the method on the Norwegian banking sector during the Norwegian banking crisis in the early 
90’s.  Thus,   these   “favorable”   circumstances   should  better   indicate  of   the properties of the risk 
measure. The authors find that the stock market forecasted the crisis well before (over a year) the 
crisis has been agreed to have begun at the earliest.  
 
4. Method 
 
4.1 Merton approach  
The Merton model was developed to evaluate  the  credit  risk  of  a  company’s  debt.  Simplified,  the  
model  measures  the  probability  of  default  by  combining  the  market  asset’s  volatility  with  asset  
and debt levels. The firm is assumed to default when the asset value falls below the value of the 
debt.  
 
The first step towards determining the default probability is to identify the probability distribution 
of the assets at the time of the maturing, time T. We will, as the original Merton model, assume 
that the logarithm of the asset value is normally distributed. The yearly log variance of the asset 
value changes by 𝜎ଶ  and the expected yearly change of the asset value is denoted by 𝜇 − 𝜎ଶ/
2  where 𝜇 is a drift parameter. With this established and normal distribution assumed, the log 
asset value in T can be denoted as follows: 
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ln 𝐴௧  ~   𝑁 ൭(ln𝐴௧ + (𝜇 − 𝜎
ଶ
2ൗ )(𝑇 − 𝑡), 𝜎
ଶ(𝑇 − 𝑡)൱ (1) 
 
Theoretically, if we knew L (liabilities), 𝐴௧ , 𝜇 and 𝜎ଶ estimating the default probability would 
only be a matter of statistics where the probability of default could be calculated as follows: 
 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = Φ
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ln 𝐿 − ln 𝐴௧ − (𝜇 − 𝜎
ଶ
2ൗ )(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
= Φ
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ln ቀ𝐿 𝐴௧ൗ
ቁ − (𝜇 − 𝜎
ଶ
2ൗ )(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
(2) 
 
where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution.  
 
To clarify one step further, we are measuring how many standard deviations away from default 
𝐴௧  is. This measure is often referred to as distance to default in credit risk literature and is 
denoted by;  
 
𝐷𝐷 =
ln𝐴௧ + (𝜇 − 𝜎
ଶ
2ൗ )(𝑇 − 𝑡) − ln 𝐿
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
 
⇒ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = Φ[−𝐷𝐷] 
(3) 
 
 
The below figure from “Credit risk modelling using Excel and VBA”  (Löffler and Posch, Wiley 
Finance (2007), p. 29) demonstrates the above explained idea of the Merton model. 
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Figure 1:The Merton Model 
 
 
As we have indicated above, to apply the Merton model on a real company, it takes more than 
basic statistics. This is due to the fact that we cannot observe  the  market  value  of  the  firm’s  assets,  
meaning that we do not know 𝐴௧ and consequently, neither its volatility. From the  firm’s  balance  
sheet we can observe the book value of the assets but this may differ from the market value for 
many reasons. Merton chose to apply option pricing theory in order to establish a relationship 
between the two (related) unobservable variables and the observable ones. Note that this demands 
a publicly traded firm as we start by observing the market value of equity which is the share price 
multiplied with the number of outstanding shares. We have already assumed the value of the 
liabilities at time T (by assuming consistent maturity structure) and we can also assume that in the 
event of default, the bondholders will claim the assets and equity is zero (note that this would be 
done at time T). However, under ordinary circumstances where the asset value is above the value 
of the liabilities, the equity holders get the residual value. This can be demonstrated as they pay-
off for a European call option:  
 
𝐸௧ = max  (0, 𝐴௧ − 𝐿) 
 
The pay-off follows that of a European call option on the underlying assets of the bank 𝐴௧ and the 
liabilities L representing the strike price. For bondholders, the pay-off mimics that of a portfolio 
consisting of a risk-free zero coupon bond valued at L together with a short put on the assets with 
strike price L.  
 
12 
 
 
Graph 1: European call option 
 
 
      
Assuming that no dividends are paid out, the equity at t can be determined with the Black-
Scholes call option formula (1973). 
 
 𝐸௧ = 𝐴௧ ∙ Φ(𝑑ଵ) − 𝐿𝑒ି௥(்ି௧)Φ(𝑑ଶ) (4) 
 
where 
 
𝑑ଵ =
ln  (𝐴௧ 𝐿ൗ ) + (𝑟 +
𝜎ଶ
2ൗ )(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
 
(5) 
 
and 
 𝑑ଶ = 𝑑ଵ − 𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡 (6) 
 
 
r denotes the risk free interest rate.  
 
If we then rearrange the formula to free the market asset value 𝐴௧, we get 
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 𝐴௧ = ൣ𝐸௧ + 𝐿௧𝑒ି௥௧(்ି௧)(𝑑ଶ)൧  /(𝑑ଵ) (7) 
 
 
for  “today’s”  asset  value  and  by  doing  this  for  all  trading  days  in  a  year  we  can get a system of 
equations. Assuming the one year maturity (i.e setting (T-t) to 1), the system will look as follows; 
 
 𝐴௧ = ൣ𝐸௧ + 𝐿௧𝑒ି௥௧(்ି௧)(𝑑ଶ)൧  /(𝑑ଵ) 
𝐴௧ିଵ = [𝐸௧ିଵ + 𝐿௧ିଵ𝑒ି௥௧ିଵ(𝑑ଶ)]  /(𝑑ଵ) 
… 
𝐴௧ିଶ଺଴ = [𝐸௧ିଶ଺଴ + 𝐿௧ିଶ଺଴𝑒ି௥௧ିଶ଺଴(𝑑ଶ)]  /(𝑑ଵ) 
(8) 
 
 
We do have two unknown variables, however the volatility can be estimated with the help of a 
time series of A.  
 
With A and its volatility found by help of the system above only one variable is left to find, the 
drift rate. The drift parameter is determined using CAPM (9). By regressing the asset values 
returns on the OMX index return we obtain β, the sensitivity of the asset return compared to the 
market portfolio return. We assume a market risk premium rate of 4% and estimate the expected 
return of the asset. By taking the logarithm of (1+E(ri)), the drift rate is obtained.  
 
 𝐸(𝑟௜) = 𝑟௙ + 𝛽௜௠(𝐸(𝑟௠) − 𝑟௙) (9) 
 
We now have all the variables to calculate distance to default which we by the cumulative 
standard normal distribution turn into a probability measure,  
𝐷𝐷 =
ln𝐴௧ + (𝜇 − 𝜎
ଶ
2ൗ )(𝑇 − 𝑡) − ln 𝐿
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
 
⇒ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = Φ[−𝐷𝐷] 
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4.2 The Hall and Miles market based approach  
The  Hall  and  Miles  market  based  approach  is  based  on  the  idea  of  solely  relying  on  the  market’s  
ability  of  evaluating  a  firm’s  balance  sheet,  thus  its  portfolio  of  assets  and  liabilities.  Needless  to  
say, an expected brighter future of a firm will be reflected in an increase in stock prices and a 
decrease in probability of default. This market based approach is using the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) in order to derive the distance to default through stock price volatility. In 
summary the approach assumes market efficiency and that CAPM is able to capture the risk 
return relationship. As market efficiency is assumed, the variability of the market expectations 
reflects  the  variability  in  a  firm’s  assets  and  liabilities. As in all structural credit risk approaches, 
the company defaults when liabilities are greater than assets. Hence we can use the variability 
(explained below) to derive a simple metric for determining the probability of default. 
 
To start with, the basic assumption made is an efficiently determined share price  
 
 
𝑆௜௧ =
Σ௝ୀଵ
௡ 𝑃௝௧𝑋௝௧
𝑁
 (10) 
 
Where 𝑆௜௧  is the price of stock i at time t, 𝑃௝௧  is the price of stock i’s   assets/liability,  𝑋௝௧  is 
asset/liability and N is the number of shares.  
 
As mentioned above, the measure of the default probability is based on a conditional version of 
CAPM. As per CAPM, the expected return at time t, 𝐸(𝑅௧) for an individual stock can be divided 
into the risk free return at time t, 𝑅𝐹௧ and the (time varying) risk premium 𝑅𝑃௧.  
 
 
 
𝐸(𝑅௧) =
𝐸(𝑆௧ − 𝑆௧ିଵ)
𝑆௧ିଵ
= 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝑅𝑃௧ (11) 
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where the risk premium can be further expanded  to 
 
 𝑅௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸(𝑁𝐷௧) + 𝜀௧ (12) 
 
where 𝜆௧ is the market price of risk and 𝐸(𝑁𝐷௧) is the amount of expected non-diversifiable risk. 
As CAPM is only true on average a stochastic error term is added at the end, making the above 
expression to show the actual return (i.e. not the expected).  
 
We are now ready to express the actual bank capital; 
 
 𝑆௧𝑁 = 𝑆௧ିଵ𝑁{1 + 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸(𝑁𝐷௧) + 𝜀௧} (13) 
 
As the right side of the above expression shows, the bank capital is the value of all outstanding 
shares as share price is assumed to efficiently reflect the balance sheet. The value of the bank 
capital is determined by 
 
 (𝑆௧ିଵ𝑁)ଶ𝜎ఌ೟
ଶ  (14) 
 
where 𝜎ఌ೟
ଶ  represents the variance in the market value of the underlying asset, the bank, around 
the expected market value. Assuming the market effectivity holds, we can by dividing the value 
of the asset 𝑆௧ିଵ𝑁 with its standard deviation 𝑆௧ିଵ𝑁𝜎ఌ೟  obtain a value representing the number of 
standard deviations of the value of the bank; a measure of the distance to default. 
 𝑆௧ିଵ𝑁
𝑆௧ିଵ𝑁𝜎ఌ೟
=
1
𝜎ఌ೟
 (15) 
 
This value can then be transformed into a probability of default. For example, a measure 1/σக౪ = 
2,33 indicates at 1 in 100 probably of default whilst a value of 3,09 indicates a 1 in 1000 
probability. Since this gives us the distance to default, an increase in the standard deviation 
means a lower value of the quota, indicating a short distance to default and in return a higher 
probability of default. 
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In order to find σக౪  we continue by rewriting formula (11), which according to CAPM can be 
written as  
 
𝐸(𝑅௧) =
𝐸(𝑆௧ − 𝑆௧ିଵ)
𝑆௧ିଵ
= 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝛽௧𝐸(𝑅𝑀௧ − 𝑅𝐹௧) (16) 
 
where 𝑅𝑀௧ is the return on the market portfolio, OMX N40 in our case and β is defined as the 
expected covariance between the return of the individual stock and the expect return of the 
market portfolio divided by the expected variance of the return on the market portfolio:  
 𝐸(𝜎ோ೟,ோெ೟)
𝐸(𝜎ோெ೟
ଶ )
 (17) 
 
Further on, according to CAPM, the risk premium on the market portfolio is the market price of 
risk, 𝜆௧, multiplied by the expected variance  𝐸(𝜎ோெ೟ଶ ) of the market portfolio returns. The market 
price of risk, 𝜆௧ is defined as the expected excess return on the market portfolio over the risk-rate 
divided by the expected variance on the market portfolio.  
 
𝜆௧ =
𝐸(𝑅𝑀௧ − 𝑅𝐹௧)
𝐸(𝜎ோெ೟
ଶ )
 (18) 
 
This gives us 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑀௧) = 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸(𝜎ோெ೟
ଶ ) (19) 
 
Formula (12) is adapted from the stock to the market portfolio, giving 
 𝑅𝑀௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸൫𝜎ோெ೟
ଶ ൯ + 𝜐௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸൫𝜎జ೟
ଶ ൯ + 𝜐௧ (20) 
 
which on average is correct plus an error term, υ୲, that is zero on average. 
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We continue by adding the error term 𝜀௧   to formula (16) while replacing β with its definition. 
 
 
𝑅௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ +
𝐸(𝜎ோ೟,ோெ೟)𝐸(𝑅𝑀௧ − 𝑅𝐹௧)
𝐸(𝜎ோெ೟
ଶ )
+ 𝜀௧ (21) 
 
and using the definition of the market price of risk  
 𝑅௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸൫𝜎ோ೟,ோெ೟൯ + 𝜀௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝜆௧𝐸൫𝜎ఌ೟,జ೟൯+𝜀௧ (22) 
 
To finally obtain our distance to default measures, it is necessary to model the variances and 
covariances from (20) and (22). In three previous papers, the authors Hall and Miles (1990), 
Claire and Priestly (2002) and Byström (2003) have all chosen different variations of ARCH to 
model these variances and covariances. Hall and Miles chose restricted versions of ARCH and 
GARCH. Claire and Priestley used a non-standard AGARCH-M bivariate model. Byström 
argued   “when   estimating   a   multivariate   GARCH-M system one easily ends up with tens (or 
hundreds) of parameters to estimate. In order to keep the number of parameters down, and 
hopefully get more reasonable parameter estimates, one should therefore favor parsimonious 
representations  to  more  elaborated  ones” (p. 11). We have therefore chosen  to  follow  Byström’s  
example of a GARCH(1,1) representation overlooking potential asymmetries or seasonality, 
rather than the representations of Hall and Miles and Claire and Priestley. In order to narrow 
down the parameters necessary to estimate, a constant market price of risk and a constant 
correlation for the covariance matrix are assumed.  
Using GARCH(1,1) refers to the use of the most recent observation of 𝑢ଶ and the most recent 
estimate of 𝜎ଶ –  we calculate the variance rate, 𝜎௡ଶ  on the market portfolio according to the 
following formula: 
 
 𝜎௡ଶ = 𝛾𝑉௅ + 𝛼𝑢௡ିଵଶ + 𝛽𝜎௡ିଵଶ  (23) 
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where 𝑉௅ is the long-run average variance rate and 𝑢௜ is the continuously compounded return,  
 
𝑢௜ = 𝑙𝑛
𝑆௧
𝑆௧ିଵ
 (24) 
 
and 𝛾, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are weights assigned to the different parameters where 
𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1. 
To be able to calculate 𝛾 we set 𝜔 =   𝛾𝑉௅ which gives us the model  
 𝜎௡ଶ =   𝜔 + 𝛼𝑢௡ିଵଶ + 𝛽𝜎௡ିଵଶ  (25) 
 
By estimating the parameters 𝜔, 𝛼 and 𝛽, we are then able to obtain 𝛾 as 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 and 𝑉௅ as 
ఠ
ఊ
.  
To estimate the true parameters necessary for the GARCH(1,1) model we start by giving the 
parameters random weights. To obtain the correct values we continue by using the maximum 
likelihood approach. The problem consists of estimating the variance of a variable, X, with 
𝑢ଵ,  𝑢ଶ…,  𝑢௠ number of normally distributed observations. The variance estimated for day i, 𝜎௜ଶ 
is defined as 𝑣௜. The probability of 𝑢௜ being observed is given by the probability density function 
of 𝑋 = 𝑢௜. 
 
ෑቈ
1
ඥ2𝜋𝑣௜
𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቆ
−𝑢௜
ଶ
2𝑣௜
ቇ቉
௠
௜ୀଵ
 (26) 
 
and by taking the logarithms we have the expression  
 
෍ቈ− ln(𝑣௜) −
𝑢௜
ଶ
𝑣௜
቉
௠
௜ୀଵ
 (27) 
 
This expression is then maximized by adjusting the parameters 𝜔, 𝛼 and 𝛽1. With these 
parameters estimated, we are able to proceed to estimate the following parameters:  
 
                                                          
1 Parameters are shown in the results section. 
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 𝑅௧ − 𝑅𝐹௧ = 𝛼௜,ଵ + 𝜆𝐸൫𝜎ఌ೟,జ೟൯ + 𝜀௧ 
 
𝑅𝑀௧ − 𝑅𝐹௧ = 𝛼௠,ଵ + 𝜆𝐸൫𝜎జ೟
ଶ ൯ + 𝜐௧ 
(28) 
 
 
 
𝐸൫𝜎ఌ೟
ଶ ൯ = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝜀௧ିଵଶ + 𝛽𝜎ఌ೟షభ
ଶ  
𝐸൫𝜎జ೟
ଶ ൯ = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝜐௧ିଵଶ + 𝛽𝜎జ೟షభ
ଶ  
𝐸൫𝜎ఌ೟,జ೟൯ = 𝜌ఌ,జට𝐸(𝜎జ೟
ଶ )𝐸(𝜎ఌ೟
ଶ ) 
(29) 
 
where 𝐸൫𝜎ఌ೟
ଶ ൯ and 𝐸൫𝜎జ೟
ଶ ൯ are the expected conditional variances, 𝜌ఌ,జ is the correlation 
coefficient between 𝜀  and 𝜐 and 𝐸൫𝜎ఌ೟,జ೟൯ represents the expected covariance between 𝜀௧ and  𝜐௧. 
𝜀௧ = 𝜎ఌ೟𝑢ଵ and 𝜐௧ = 𝜎జ೟𝑢ଶ where 𝑢௜~𝑁(0,1) – ultimately ending up with our distance to default 
coefficient 𝜎ఌ೟. 
In order to match the results from the Hall and Miles market based approach with the Merton 
approach, a view of quarterly data with probability of default within one year is chosen. This is 
achieved this by multiplying the sum of the daily 𝜎ఌ೟ for each quarter with the square root of four. 
 
5. Data 
 
5.1 Shares 
We obtain daily share prices of the six major Scandinavian banks (Danske Bank, DNB, 
Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank) from Datastream. The data is collected over the 
time period 2005Q1-2013Q4. 
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5.2 Balance sheet data 
Quarterly data of the banks liabilities and outstanding shares are collected from the banks 
respective balance sheet data. The market value of equity of the banks is calculated by taking the 
daily share price times the average number of outstanding shares for that quarter. The quarterly 
figures of the liabilities are connected with the daily figure of market value of equity by taking 
the liabilities as it was known in that time period, i.e. the data of liabilities for Q1 is available for 
use in Q2. The liabilities of Q1 are connected with the market value of equity of Q2.  
 
5.3 Risk-free rate 
To simulate the risk-free rate of return, the 12 month Interbank Offered Rates for Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark are collected 2 . STIBOR, NIBOR, CIBOR respectively; Stockholm, 
Norway and Copenhagen Interbank Offered Rate. The IBOR rates are obtained from the Swedish 
and Norwegian national banks and Datastream for the CIBOR. 
 
5.4 Market portfolio 
To represent the market portfolio in CAPM, the OMX N40 stock market index is used. The OMX 
N40 is a capitalization-weighted stock market index administered by the Nasdaq OMX Group. It 
consists of the 40 most traded stocks on the Nordic markets operated by the Nasdaq OMX Group 
- Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Reykjavik. Nasdaq OMX does not operate on the 
Norwegian market, hence no Norwegian stocks are included. No Icelandic stocks are currently 
included in the index (February 2015). Prominent companies in the index are ABB, Hennes & 
Mauritz, Volvo Group, Novo Nordisk with Nokia having the largest weight (February 2015) as 
well as five of the major Nordic banks (DNB not included). Since the essay is focused on 
Scandinavian banks, a market portfolio consisting of Scandinavian or Nordic companies is 
appropriate. Other indices such as the S&P500 could also have been used although the writers 
deemed a local market portfolio more relevant. 
 
                                                          
2 As of 2013-03-04 the STIBOR 12M was not available and the STIBOR 6M was used instead. 
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6. Results 
 
Below is the summary statistics of the daily returns between 2005Q1 and 2013Q4. From the 
standard deviation we can tell that SEB and Swedbank had the highest volatility during this 
period while Handelsbanken had the lowest. DNB and Handelsbanken had the highest average 
return while Danske Bank experienced a negative, even if close to zero, average return. In line 
with the volatility measure, SEB followed by Swedbank had the highest, and lowest, observed 
returns. From table 2 we can clearly see that that the banks were affected by the global financial 
crisis. A common denominator for all six is that their share prices all dropped to their lowest in 
2009, after the crisis hit. Worst hit was Swedbank with a remaining value of a mere 6,5% of that 
before the crisis, just two years after its maximum. 
 
Looking at table 1 again, the skewness measures of the returns show that Danske Bank, DNB and 
Swedbank had a negatively skewed distribution. This means that the probability distribution of 
the returns has an asymmetric tail extended towards the left. The distribution of returns of 
Nordea, Handelsbanken and SEB were positively skewed, especially the distribution for Nordea. 
A skewness measure equal to zero implies normal distribution. Hence, the returns are not 
normally distributed. Also from the kurtosis we can tell that the returns are not normally 
distributed. A value higher than 3 indicates a higher peak than a normal distribution. In addition 
to the below tables, appendix 1 contains graphs of the asset returns and appendix 2 shows the 
yearly volatility for each bank.  
Table 1: Summary statistics for 2005Q1-2013Q4. Number of observations: 2346. 
 
  
Mean Standard Dev Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum
DANSKE BANK -0.0000378 0.0221782 5.7416574 -0.0865960 -0.1718299 0.1396680
DNB 0.0002737 0.0257747 9.8601086 -0.1190277 -0.2050746 0.2109305
HANDELSBANKEN 0.0002709 0.0195696 6.4833310 0.1643223 -0.1073993 0.1328609
NORDEA 0.0002195 0.0215593 6.2748332 0.5284164 -0.1203243 0.1491267
SEB 0.0001214 0.0272053 11.3012416 0.0539497 -0.2232196 0.2321481
SWEDBANK 0.0001124 0.0269092 7.8025816 -0.1989435 -0.2053768 0.1735784
OMX 0.0003267 0.0151998 5.0313021 -0.1288646 -0.0834942 0.0982940
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Table 2: Highest and lowest observed share price for 2005Q1-2013Q4. The currencies for the 
prices are DKK for Danske Bank, NOK for DNB, SEK for Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB, 
Swedbank and EUR for OMX.  
 
 
In the following tables and charts an extract of the probabilities of default are provided. In order 
to narrow down the results, the full period is not shown in the tables but can be found in appendix 
3 together with the distance to default measures in appendix 4. Distance to default and probability 
to default are inversely related. The shorter the distance to default, which indicates the number of 
standard deviations around the expected value of the bank, the higher the probability of default.  
  
Table 3: Summary of the one year probabilities of default results using the Merton model 
 
 
 
 
DANSKE BANK DNB HANDELSBANKEN NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK OMX
Max 256.62 109.9 317.3 93.67 128.2 233.26 1441.46
Date 19.02.2007 28.11.2013 27.12.2013 26.04.2007 20.04.2007 15.02.2007 10.11.2007
Min 31 15.86 85.5 32.07 15.99 15.22 500.4
Date 06.03.2009 20.01.2009 02.02.2009 23.01.2009 03.03.2009 06.03.2009 06.03.2009
MERTON DANSKE BANK DNB SHB NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK
Q4 2007 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,242% 0,315%
Q1 2008 0,713% 0,233% 0,612% 0,315% 1,468% 0,735%
Q2 2008 0,854% 0,254% 0,421% 0,127% 1,915% 1,212%
Q3 2008 2,517% 8,150% 1,503% 2,681% 6,684% 10,713%
Q4 2008 29,144% 21,709% 12,356% 16,420% 28,163% 26,142%
Q1 2009 19,092% 10,098% 6,432% 9,877% 21,640% 20,234%
Q2 2009 1,774% 4,459% 0,701% 1,782% 4,191% 7,645%
Q3 2009 0,095% 0,720% 0,136% 0,116% 0,898% 0,885%
Q4 2009 0,436% 0,727% <0,01% 0,052% 0,224% 0,189%
Q1 2010 <0,01% 0,030% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2010 1,667% 0,168% 0,018% 0,489% 0,782% 1,061%
Q3 2010 0,211% 0,042% <0,01% 0,015% 0,011% <0,01%
Q4 2010 0,014% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2011 0,306% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2011 0,096% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2011 2,374% 1,657% 0,331% 1,095% 2,655% 3,946%
Q4 2011 1,343% 1,968% 0,139% 1,453% 1,231% 0,947%
Q1 2012 0,064% 0,050% <0,01% <0,01% 0,022% 0,018%
Q2 2012 0,128% 0,732% <0,01% 0,059% 0,052% 0,018%
Q3 2012 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2012 0,025% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,039%
Q2 2013 0,086% 0,023% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2013 0,013% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
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Table 4: Summary of the one year probabilities of default results using the Hall and Miles 
approach 
 
 
Graph 2: The one year probability of default using the Merton model  
 
 
  
HALL & MILES DANSKE BANK DNB SHB NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK
Q4 2007 0,037% 0,828% 0,430% 0,103% 0,263% 0,273%
Q1 2008 0,437% 1,231% 0,132% 0,060% 0,219% 0,118%
Q2 2008 0,191% 0,064% 0,099% <0,01% 0,120% 0,081%
Q3 2008 0,627% 2,536% 0,048% 0,421% 6,326% 6,739%
Q4 2008 6,639% 15,377% 0,650% 2,317% 12,280% 14,765%
Q1 2009 2,798% 10,344% 1,675% 1,920% 9,047% 5,252%
Q2 2009 2,241% 4,728% 0,470% 0,956% 4,832% 7,278%
Q3 2009 0,046% 0,819% <0,01% <0,01% 0,182% 2,433%
Q4 2009 0,079% 0,643% <0,01% <0,01% 0,016% 0,081%
Q1 2010 0,014% 0,013% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2010 0,034% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,017%
Q3 2010 0,012% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2010 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2011 0,166% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2011 0,028% 0,136% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2011 1,452% 0,760% 0,103% 0,183% 2,316% 2,957%
Q4 2011 0,218% 0,126% <0,01% <0,01% 0,016% 0,033%
Q1 2012 0,091% 0,161% <0,01% <0,01% 0,039% <0,01%
Q2 2012 0,014% 0,246% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2012 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2012 0,022% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2013 <0,01% 0,012% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
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Graph 3: The one year probability of default using the Hall and Miles approach  
 
 
The normal state, according to the Merton method, is a probability of default of less than 0,01%. 
In 2008, the escalation is immense. By looking at the figures, several of the banks were in great 
risk of defaulting. In Q4 2008 Danske Bank had a one-year probability of defaulting by 29% 
meaning that if that augmentation would have lasted, the bank would on average default 
approximately once every three and a half years. Handelsbanken and Nordea fared of better than 
their competitors although they as well show alarming figures.  
  
The results obtained from the Hall and Miles approach indicate a less extreme pattern than that of 
the Merton model. However, both models indicate the impact the financial crisis had. Between 
2008Q3 and 2009Q2, a clear increase in both models appears with the greatest default 
probabilities in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1. Notable are the differences when comparing the results 
from the two models. According to the calculations done using the Hall and Miles approach, the 
financial states of Handelsbanken and Nordea appear to have been in much better shape than they 
were according to the Merton model. Also Danske Bank appears much more stable when looking 
at the Hall and Miles model, showing a default probability of less than one fourth in the last 
quarter of 2008, compared with that of the Merton model. Swedbank, SEB and DNB appear to 
have been closer to defaulting than the other banks as they show rather alarming according the 
Merton model but also the Hall and Miles approach. 
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Outside of the immediate crisis window, both models also show an increase in probability of 
default in 2011. During  this  period,  the  stock  price  of  the  banks  decreased  as  well.  Danske  Bank’s  
share price for example decreased in the end of 2011 to around 50% of its share price one year 
earlier. The share prices of the Swedish banks decreased between 18% (Swedbank) and 72% 
(Handelsbanken) and DNB saw a decrease of 38%. As of Q42013 all banks are, according to 
both models, looking at very low probabilities of default and from the results from all four 
quarters we can tell that 2013 was a rather stable year.  
 
Whilst both models certainly reflect the increased probabilities of default during the crisis, for our 
examination it is not clear if they significantly forecast the probabilities. From the tables in 
appendix 3 one can see tendencies of a more unstable economic environment from 2007Q2 and 
onwards for the Hall and Miles approach results and from 2008Q1 and onwards for the Merton 
model results. Based on the fact that one can see the same tendencies in increased probability of 
default in 2011 (however for a shorter period of time), the small increase in probability of default 
before  the  crisis  “really”  hit  the  Nordics  may  not  be  significant  enough  to  certainly conclude that 
the models forecasted the crisis. For investigation of the models forecasting abilities, it should be 
especially favorable to look at probability of default for Swedbank as the bank almost collapsed 
in October 2008.  The results from the Merton model reflect an increase in the probability of 
default from 0,735% in 2008Q1, to 1,212% 2008Q2 and then up to 10,713% in 2008Q2. The 
results from the Hall and Miles approach tell a slightly different story with 0,118% in 2008Q1 
and then decreasing to 0,081% in 2008Q2 before increasing to 6,739% in 2008Q3.  
 
The measure probability of default may be somewhat deceiving. Whilst it does more clearly show 
the changes in the health of a company compared to the distance to default measure, one should, 
as we mention in the introduction, referring to Vassalou and Xing (2008), be careful not to 
interpret these measures literally (i.e. treat the results as rankings rather than actual probabilities 
of default). With this being said we would still like to highlight what we outlined above regarding 
the differences in the results for Handelsbanken and Nordea. These two banks showed a 
significant healthier pattern with the Hall and Miles approach than with the Merton model. With 
the Hall and Miles approach relying on market expectations to a greater extent than the Merton 
model, a possible part of the explanation for Nordea could be that it was partially state owned 
 
26 
 
during the crisis. This owner structure could serve as a satisfactory factor on the market however 
one should be very careful drawing these conclusions as DNB, which is still partially state owned, 
did not seem to fare as well as Nordea. When looking at Handelsbanken, the choice of staying out 
of the Baltic countries might be one reason that the bank fared better than the others. Swedbank, 
which is at the bottom of the scope, is the bank with its largest customer base in the Baltics.   
 
6.1 GARCH(1,1) 
Below are the results of the GARCH(1,1) regression based on the OMX N40 index. The 
Maximum Likelihood function indicates the sum in function (27) where the optimal weights are 
𝜔, 𝛼 and 𝛽 as seen below. The mean return is fairly close to that of the individual banks’ as 
described in the above summary statistics. A negative skewness is shown along with a kurtosis of 
more than five. The series indicate strong evidence of autocorrelation which is successfully 
removed as demonstrated by a Ljung-Box test performed on 25 lags. 
 
Table 5: Results from GARCH (1,1) 
 
 
No of obs 2346
ML function 18526.94
ω 0.0000022
β 0.9120024
α 0.0783691
γ 0.0096285
VL 0.0002113
Skewness -0.12886461
Kurtosis 5.0313021
Mean 0.0003267
Ljung-Box
Before 2633.65
After 36.95
OMX N40
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As all models have their withdrawals, so have the Merton model and the Hall and Miles approach. 
Below follow a few points of important facts and criticism that may affect our results.   
 
- For our examination in the Merton model we assume that  the  bank’s  liability  replicates a 
zero-coupon bond with maturity of one year. As Löffler and Posch   (“Credit risk 
modelling using Excel and VBA”  Wiley  Finance  (2007),  p.  31) mention, this may seem as 
a choice based on convenience, however it can be motivated by the fact that the bank can 
be assumed to have a rather consistent maturity structure; hence new debt is issued in the 
same pace as old debt is retired. Consequently, the default probability is given for the 
point in time when the debt is assumed to have matured and we can measure the 
probability that the value of the assets at that time is lower than the debt. 
 
- Further on, the  Merton  model  relies  on  the  Black  and  Scholes’  option  pricing  theory. This 
theory relies on several assumptions which may bias the estimated asset value. The most 
commonly criticized assumptions of the theory are that no dividends are paid out, no 
commission, constant risk free rate and volatility and normally distributed returns.  
 
- Due to the fact that we do not have access to any empirical database for converting our 
results obtained from the Merton model, we assume normality in the asset returns and 
value distribution. Thus we do not take into account that the actual distributions are 
heavier tailed and this may lead to an underestimation of the probability of default.  
 
- One has to keep in mind that there are external options such as capital raising and 
government intervention in order to reduce the probability of default.  
 
- Our calculations ignore the fact of fat tailed return distributions. For further studies it is 
appealing to apply extreme value theory as Byström (2003) does in order to more 
accurately imitate the return distributions. Alternatively one can examine the possibilities 
of substituting the normal distribution with a t-distribution as this distribution has heavier 
tails.  
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- As CAPM is used to estimate the volatility of equity in the Hall and Miles approach and 
to estimate the drift rate in the Merton model it is appropriate to rule out the critique that 
this model has met. Roll (1977) stated, in what came be known as Roll’s  critique,  flaws  
with CAPM.  Most famously that the market portfolio is unobservable. The true market 
portfolio would need to consist of every possible asset, not limited to stocks and bonds 
but e.g. commodities, real estate and human capital. It is not possible to fully mimic the 
true market portfolio and most of the time is represented by a broad index such as the 
S&P 500 were we have chosen the more confined  index OMX N40.  
 
- Worth noting is that methods using stock market prices as an indicator is most likely to 
not reflect reality in less developed economies. However in highly developed countries 
such as the Nordics, stock market prices are likely to include all public information. 
Elsinger et al. (2006) on the other hand explain that one cannot rely fully on the financial 
institutions’  stock  market  prices  anywhere  as  there  is  private  information  that  may  affect  
an   institution’s   risk   exposure.   This   type   of   information   can   only   be   obtained   from  
supervisory bank micro data and loan registers.  
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RISK LINKAGES 
 
As a consequence of the global financial crisis, assessing systemic risk has become of greater 
importance. Chan-Lau (2013) informs that the crisis has led to market analysts and authorities 
now paying more attention to systemic risk instead of the individual risks the financial 
institutions would face in isolation. Under economic circumstances such as a crisis, only 
assessing isolated risk underestimates the risk for the financial institution in question and as well 
as for the whole system as the potential spillover effects are not taken into account. In this second 
complementary part we aim to examine the systemic risk between the Nordic banks and if any of 
the banks seem to have significantly stronger linkages. This kind of knowledge is important as 
spillover effects will deepen and broaden the secondary effects in the event of deterioration in the 
health of one of the banks. 
7. Literature review     
According   to   the   IMF’s   country   report   “Nordic  Regional  Report”   (2013),   the Nordic countries 
share favorable characteristics such as high income equality, high employment and low public 
debt. However, the countries also face identical challenges such as for example large banking 
sectors, instability on housing market and high household debts. The risks of these challenges are 
aggravated  by  the  countries’  close  economic  ties  and  the  structure  of  the  financial  markets  with  a  
few relatively large financial actors on the markets, also them with strong ties to each other.  
Based on the lesson we learnt from the global financial crisis and also the structure of the Nordic 
banking sector, there is an importance of not only examining the Nordic banks health separately 
but  also  look  at  how  one  bank’s  health  seems  to  affect  the  other  banks.   
In the same report from IMF, an experiment is performed by simulating a default of a 
hypothetical big Nordic bank in order to investigate the impact on the GDP in the Nordic region. 
The results show that the failure of the hypothetical bank could have a substantial impact on GDP 
in all Nordic countries and that problems in any one of the banks is likely to spread across the 
countries’  respective  financial  sectors.  The  results  from  this  simulation  do  not  only  indicate  the  
important role the banks are playing but also how they are all linked to each other.  
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The linkages between the banks are related to systemic risk, however there are several ways of 
defining this risk. Kaufman and Scott (2003)  summarize  three  definitions  of  systemic  risk;;  1:  ”An  
event having effects on the entire banking, financial or economic system, rather than on just one 
or a few institutions, 2:   “Risk   of   a   chain   reaction   of   falling   interconnected   dominos”   and   3:  
“Systemic risk is the similarities in third-party risk exposure”. Borri et al. (2012) characterize 
systemic  risk  by  three  factors;;  “  (a)  it  affects  a  substantial  portion  of  the  financial  system;;  (b)  it  
involves negative externalities; (c) it requires intervention of public authorities for prevention and, 
eventually, management of the risky environment.“. 
With different ways of defining systemic risk come different ways of measuring this risk. As 
Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) mention, the obvious and perhaps the most accurate 
way of investigating systemic risk would be to map out the linkages between financial 
institutions based on their balance sheets however such method would be time consuming and 
would produce unclear results. Borri et al. (2012) divide the literature on systemic risk into 
network analysis and micro-evidences. The network analysis focuses on the loss distribution of 
the companies examined and estimates how an eventual distress would affect the creditors while 
the second approach focuses on the individual company’s marginal contribution to systemic rrisk. 
According to Hautsch et al. (2013) the majority of the financial network models rely on detailed 
data containing intra-bank assets and liability exposures that are generally not available to the 
public and hence difficult apply on real cases. As a consequence of this, the remaining studies 
cannot produce results that fully reflect a   company’s   systemic relevance. The micro-evidence 
approach uses bank specific variables in order to estimate the contribution of systemic risk of 
each individual institution. The existing literature using this approach often relies on credit 
default swap (CDS) data. For instance, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) investigates how firms 
contribute to systemic risk on an individual level by using their CDSs in a multivariate copula 
setting and Giglio (2010) measures the system default risk in a financial sector by using bond and 
CDS data. 
For our investigation of the risk linkages between the banks we will rely on a method within the 
micro-evidence approach initially proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). The authors 
study a large number of financial institutions impact on the system in the US during the period 
1986-2010 (however, as we will review below in this section the method can be used to measure 
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the impact of one financial institution on another). By  using   the   financial   institutions’  market-
value  asset   returns  they  calculate  the  CoVaR  and  marginal  CoVaR  (ΔCoVaR)  where  the  prefix  
Co stands for conditional, contagion or co-movement. Their definition of CoVaR is a given level 
of the value at risk of the system conditional on an individual financial institution experiencing 
distress. This distress is defined as the individual institution being at a given value at risk 
percentage (1% in this essay). With CoVaR the authors further calculate  the  ΔCoVaR.  By  taking  
the   1%   CoVaR  minus   the   “normal   state”   50%   CoVaR,   the   authors   capture   each   institution’s  
marginal contribution to the systemic risk. The authors calculate the unconditional CoVaR 
measure described above but also a conditional measure which includes macro variables in order 
to capture the status of the economic environment. The macro variables included are the US yield 
curve which is assumed to capture the short term liquidity risk, the aggregated credit spread 
which is assumed to control for the business cycle and lastly a volatility index to reflect investor 
sentiment.  Finally   the  authors  develop  a   forward   looking  ΔCoVaR,  a  measure   to  predict   future  
marginal  contribution  to  systemic  risk.  This  is  done  by  regressing  the  ΔCoVaR  on firm specific 
variables such as leverage and market-to-book value. With this measure the authors show that the 
2006Q4 value of this measure predicts more than 50% of the co-variances that emerged during 
the financial crisis.   
 
The original VaR which was introduced and popularized by RiskMetricsTM is widely accepted 
as a risk measurement and aims to measure the potential losses for a portfolio, i.e.  “What  is  the  
worst   case   scenario?”.   The  measure   has   gained trust in the banking industry, especially since 
adopted by Basel as the primary measure to calculate market risk capital requirements. However 
when comparing VaR with CoVaR it becomes clear that VaR only focuses on the risk of an 
individual institution in isolation – In fact, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) show that that there 
is  only  a  weak  correlation  between  an  institution’s  VaR  and  its  contribution  to  the  systemic  risk.   
 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) use historical data on market-valued asset returns with quantile 
regression in their estimation of CoVaR,  primarily  due  to  this  regression  method’s  simplicity  and  
efficient use of data. However the authors show that CoVaR may also be estimated with other 
methods such as for example GARCH models. A quantile regression is in comparison to for 
example Ordinary Least Square (OLS) more convenient when one is focusing on the tail ends of 
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a distribution. Quantile regression was introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and the 
regression provides for each quantile a coefficient that estimates the effect in the response 
variable produced by a one unit change in the predictor variable. The OLS coefficient estimates 
the change in the mean of the response variable produced by a one unit change in the predictor 
variable, keeping other predictor variables fixed (Greene, Econometric Analysis (2011)). As an 
example, Koenker and Hallock (2001) examine the effect of prenatal visits on birth weight with 
the help of quantile regression and OLS. In this case, the authors show that OLS fail to capture 
useful information regarding the relationship between prenatal visits and birth weight. The 
quantile regression showed that the consequences of no prenatal care had a larger effect on birth 
weight for the new-born in the lower quantiles compared to the effect on the mean weight.  
 
A number of recent papers have extended the CoVaR method and applied it to financial sectors. 
Borri et. al (2012) apply the model to over 200 European banks in order to study the contribution 
to systemic risk. Furthermore they use OLS to examine how different micro variables of banks 
affect their systemic risk contribution. They find that the variables size, leverage and 
concentration (i.e operating in a concentrated banking market) have a significant impact on the 
systemic risk contribution. A paper closely related to this essay is Adams et al. (2010) which 
study risk spillovers between U.S financial institutions rather than the institutions contribution to 
the   system   risk.   They   further   refine   the  CoVaR   by   developing   a   “State-Dependent Sensitivity 
Value-at-Risk”  which  includes  that  spillovers  are  determined  simultaneously  and  also  focuses  on  
the   spillover   effects   during  a   crisis.  They   find   that   “size   and  duration  of   risk   spillovers   among  
financial institutions to change substantially between market phases. While risk spillovers are 
small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects during crisis 
times” (p. 2). Their results when comparing between different classes of financial institutions also 
provide useful information regarding hedge funds as transmission channels and amplifiers of 
systemic risk. Also Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) look at the spillovers between 
banks (and their effect on the system) by using CoVaR. They include six commercial Thai banks 
in their study and also conclude that the variables size and interbank deposits have a significant 
effect on the spillover effects from one bank to another.  
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While our results from using CoVaR will not show the mechanisms behind the estimated 
spillover, the above literature review has mentioned size, leverage, concentration and interbank 
deposits as significant variables. It may be of interest to mention that Bartholomew and Wharden 
(1995)   list   interbank   loans,   structure   and   diversification   of   the   institution’s   portfolios and 
information effects among the most influent factors of the intensity and strength of interbank 
relations.   Elsinger   et   al   (2006)   find   that   the   correlation   in   banks’   assets   portfolios   plays   the  
biggest role in contributing to systemic risk. Hall and Miles (1990) also mention an important 
view – A negative externality as an information problem. A default of one bank may not 
theoretically affect the financial system significantly however it may lead to unstableness in the 
system anyway due to the undermining of confidence.  
8. Method 
To start with we will briefly explain the theoretical background of quantile regression and VaR 
that the CoVaR model relies on.  
In summary there are three methods to calculate VaR. The Variance-Covariance (parametric) 
method assumes that the stock returns are normally distributed in order to find the worst 1% or 5% 
(or another value) loss on the curve. The Monte Carlo analysis produces simulated future prices 
and looks at worst losses of these. The historical method uses the daily returns and is similar to 
the parametric method but do not assume normal distribution. Instead the 1st or 5th (or another 
value) percentile will show the value at risk. We will follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) and 
use the historical method (combined with quantile regression). 
In terms of losses VaR can be defined as follows 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅௔(𝐿) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{1: Pr(𝐿 > 1) ≤ 1 − 𝑎} (30) 
      
Where the probability that the future loss L is larger than minimum loss l is less or equal to 1 − 𝛼. 
VaR can also generally be expressed as follows 
 
 Pr൫𝑋 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤൯ = 𝑞 (31) 
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Where x is loss, assets, CDS etc. 
 
As previously mentioned, we will use quantile regression. In summary, a quantile regression is 
based on minimization of the sum of residuals with asymmetric weight on these throughout the 
quantiles. A conditional quantile, in (32) expressed as a distribution of Y given the distribution of 
X, can be defined as follows 
 
 𝑄௬(𝑞|𝑥) = 𝑥ொ𝛽௤ (32) 
 
for a given quantile q. 
 
By using the above derivation we minimize equation (33) with respect to 𝛽௤ in order to obtain an 
estimate of 𝛽ఛ. This coefficient describes how much 𝑄௬(𝑞|𝑥) changes due to a one unit change in 
one of the predictor variables in vector 𝑥ொ.   
 
 1
𝑛
෍𝜌௤(𝑦௜ − 𝑥ொ𝛽௤)
௡
௜ୀଵ
 (33) 
 
With this brief review, we are now ready to construct CoVaR. Recall the definition of VaR, 
defined as 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜  as the qth quantile;  
Pr൫𝑋௜ ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜ ൯ = 𝑞 
 
Thus  𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜  is  the  quantile  q  of  the  log  returns  of  firm’s  stock  i, To this expression a conditional 
event is added, which defines the CoVaR of bank j conditional on bank i being at a given level of 
VaR.  
 Pr൫𝑋௝ ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|௜ห𝑋௜ = 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜ ൯ = 𝑞 (34) 
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In words, q is the probability of the returns of bank j’s  are  lower than 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௝|௜  within a specified 
time period given that bank i experiences distress.   
Further to measure ΔCoVaR, how much bank i’s  1%  VaR  is  affected  when  bank  j is going from 
median state (50% VaR) into financial distress (1% VaR), the CoVaR value when bank i is in its 
median state is subtracted from the calculated distressed CoVaR. 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|௜ = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|௫೔ୀ௏௔ோ೜೔ − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|௫೔ୀெ௘ௗ௜௔௡೔ (35) 
 
In practice, to  obtain  each  individual  bank’s  VaR  we  quantile regress the respective daily returns 
on  a  constant.  For  this  essay’s  interpretation  of  distress,  1%,  the  quantile  value  of  interest  is 0,01. 
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜ = 𝛼ො௤௜  (36) 
 
The log returns of bank j are then quantile regressed on the log returns of bank 3 
 𝑋௤
௝,௜ = 𝛼௤௜ + 𝛽௤௜𝑋௜ + 𝜀௤௜  (37) 
 
The coefficients for α and β are obtained from quantile 0,01. The coefficient β estimates the 
change in a specific quantile of 𝑋௝ produced by a one unit change in 𝑋௜. α and β are used with the 
𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜  to estimate the 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|௜ in the following way 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|௑௧ି௏௔ோ೜೟ = 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤
௝|𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜ = 𝛼ො௤௜ + 𝛽መ௤௜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤௜  (38) 
 
Further to calculate the ΔCoVaR we include the 50% VaR for bank i4 
                                                          
3 Coefficients provided in appendix 5 
4 Note that for the calculations in this essay, the 50% VaR for all banks will be zero as conditional CoVaR is not 
calculated.  
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 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௤ିଵ%
௝|௜ = 𝛽መ௤ିଵ%
௜ ൫𝑉𝑎𝑅௤ିଵ%
௜ − 𝑉𝑎𝑅௤ିହ଴%
௜ ൯ (39) 
 
For the interested reader follows here a short explanation of how the conditional CoVaR measure 
and spillover effects on to the system are calculated; 
For a conditional CoVaR measure the log daily returns are quantile regressed on chosen macro 
variables that form vector M.  
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅௧௜(𝑞) = 𝛼ො௤௜ + 𝛽መ௤௜𝑀௧ (40) 
 
CoVaR is then calculated as follows 
  
 𝑋௧
௝|௜(𝑞) = 𝛼௤
௝|௜ + 𝛽௤,ଵ
௝|௜𝑋௧௜ + 𝛽௤,ଶ
௝|௜𝑀௧ + 𝜀௧
௝|௜ (41) 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅௧௜(𝑞) = 𝛼ො଴
௝|௜ + 𝛽መ௤,ଵ
௝|௜𝑉𝑎𝑅௧௜(𝑞) + 𝛽መ௤,ଶ
௝|௜𝑀௧ (42) 
 
To examine the spillover effects onto the system, one simply substitutes bank j with a suitable 
index, in our case OMX N40.  
9. Data 
As in the first part of this essay, we use percentage returns of stock market data from Datastream 
for the period 2005Q1-2013Q4. The banks included are Nordea, SEB, Handelsbanken, SEB, 
Danske Bank and DNB. 
Unlike Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) we do not calculate the market-valued total assets but 
instead we rely on the stock prices to incorporate all public information available. Also, for 
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example CDS data would only reflect credit risk and we therefore confide in the stock market 
prices to reflect the different types of risk that exist in the system.   
10. Results 
Before showing our results it is important to consider that these are unconditional, constant, 
measures of CoVaR. Hence the regressions do not include any macro variables that would control 
for time-dependent variation of the tail end risk (i.e these variables would absorb some of the 
spillover effects). We do explain the results in percentage however our results are, just as in our 
first part, mainly an indicator of raking among the banks. On the other hand, adding macro 
variables may give a false perception of realistic numbers however these variables may not 
capture all time dependent changes. 
When analyzing the banks in isolation (by calculating VaR with quantile regression) we can tell 
from the diagram below that Swedbank is considered the most risky and Danske Bank and 
Handelsbanken are considered the least risky. Hence, in a worst case scenario defined as the 1% 
historically  worst   losses,  Swedbank’s  share  price  would  go  down  with  8,45%  in  one  day  while  
Danske Bank and Handelsbanken would risk a loss of 6,40% each.  
 
Diagram 1: The 1% VaR unconditional on other banks 
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When continuing on to the 1% CoVaR, we obtain the spillover effects. As an example, the 1% 
CoVaR value for Nordea|SEB, 9,52% indicates that when SEB is in distress (defined as reaching 
its 1% VaR), the VaR of Nordea is affected by 9,52%. Handelsbanken and Danske Bank appear 
to   be   the   banks   least   affected   of   other   banks’   distresses.   From   the   average,   one   can   tell   that  
Danske Bank has the smallest spillover effect on other banks and that Nordea has the largest 
spillover  on  other  banks  when  it  is  in  distress.  Most  notably  is  Nordea’s  spillover  effect  on  SEB  
and Swedbank; 14,48% and 14,02% respectively.  
Table 6: 1% CoVaR with conditioning bank i on vertical axis and dependent bank j on horizontal axis 
Bank j|Bank i               
  Nordea SEB HB Swedbank Danske DnB Average 
Nordea   -14,48% -8,64% -14,02% -9,67% -11,46% -11,65% 
SEB -9,52%   -7,92% -11,88% -9,24% -11,94% -10,10% 
HB -10,28% -12,42%   -12,71% -9,17% -12,41% -11,40% 
Swedbank -9,54% -12,95% -8,88%   -9,19% -11,54% -10,42% 
Danske -10,20% -11,60% -8,88% -13,16%   -6,07% -9,98% 
DnB -10,52% -11,61% -8,92% -12,40% -9,27%   -10,54% 
 
The last and most important measure, 1% ΔCoVaR5, quantifies how much risk bank i adds to 
bank j. Looking at Nordea|SEB again, the 5,07%, indicates the 1% VaR for Nordea is affected by 
5,07% when SEB goes from median state (50% VaR) into financial distress (1% VaR). By 
looking at this marginal contribution, we are given an indication of which banks are more 
vulnerable in a distressed environment. Again, Nordea seems to be the bank affecting the other 
banks the most when going into distress. DNB and Danske Bank appear to be the banks with the 
lowest impact on other banks and Danske Bank is also the bank less affected by other banks in 
distress. Note that also for this measure SEB is particularly affected by Nordea.  
 
 
                                                          
5 See appendix 6 for period 2007-2009 and 2012-2013 
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Table 7: 1% ΔCoVaR with conditioning bank i on vertical axis and dependent bank j on horizontal axis 
Bank j|Bank i               
  Nordea SEB HB Swedbank Danske DnB Average 
Nordea   -8,48% -4,64% -6,70% -4,17% -5,61% -5,92% 
SEB -5,07%   -8,05% -6,68% -3,74% -5,04% -5,71% 
HB -5,88% -6,82%   -6,31% -3,47% -5,61% -5,62% 
Swedbank -4,84% -7,65% -4,28%   -3,29% -4,84% -4,98% 
Danske -4,40% -5,00% -3,68% -6,06%   -4,82% -4,79% 
DnB -4,82% -5,41% -4,22% -5,70% -3,97%   -4,82% 
  
 
When considering the fact from previous research that the VaR is not correlated with the CoVaR, 
one can conclude that the same holds for this study. Swedbank has the highest VaR but one of the 
lower ΔCoVaR. Nordea that has one of the lower VaR comes out with the highest ΔCoVaR.  
 
To summarize the results; overall, Nordea is the bank affecting other banks the most. Especially 
notable is the spillover effects from Nordea on to SEB. Danske Bank comes out as the bank with 
least spillover effects on the other banks. Previous literature suggests that the variable size has a 
significant impact on spillover effects which may partly explain the measures for Nordea. 
However, this is not true for Danske Bank that is also one of the larger banks of the sample. A 
ranking of the banks are not appropriate as the results are within a narrow span. Still, by looking 
an individual spillovers from one specific bank on to another, we can obtain valuable indicators.  
 
11. Summary and conclusions 
This essay has examined the credit risks and risk linkages of the six major Nordic commercial 
banks. It has critically reviewed the results and evaluated the chosen models. With regards to the 
probability of default, Nordea and Handelsbanken seem to have fared better than its peers. 
However, when looking at the spillover effects between the banks, these two banks appear to 
have the highest spillover effects on the other banks. With this kind of result it is difficult to rank 
the  banks  or  appoint  one  bank  as  “safer” or  “riskier” than another. An important lesson learned is 
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that looking at the banks in isolation is not enough to obtain a full picture of the current status of 
a bank.  
 
The probabilities of default obtained from the Merton model compared to the ones obtained from 
the Hall and Miles approach show an overall similar trend but the ranking (and naturally also the 
numbers)  except  for  the  “healthier”  Nordea  and  Handelsbanken during the financial crisis differ. 
None of the models seem to have forecasted the crisis significantly.  
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13. Appendices  
 
Appendix 1:  
Histograms of asset returns compared to the normal distributions for the individual banks.  
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Appendix 2: 
Yearly volatilities of the individual banks. 
 
 
  
Danske Bank DNB Handelsbanken Nordea SEB Swedbank
2006 1,12% 2,21% 1,71% 1,57% 1,18% 1,72%
2007 1,06% 1,73% 1,52% 1,50% 1,61% 2,36%
2008 1,58% 2,77% 2,81% 2,44% 1,97% 2,53%
2009 1,00% 2,08% 1,92% 2,09% 1,79% 1,66%
2010 0,93% 1,87% 1,30% 1,50% 1,40% 1,59%
2011 1,14% 2,15% 1,48% 1,60% 1,67% 2,35%
2012 0,79% 1,55% 1,31% 1,00% 1,22% 1,60%
2013 0,85% 2,20% 1,52% 1,20% 1,21% 2,20%
Average 1,06% 2,07% 1,70% 1,61% 1,51% 2,00%
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Appendix 3: 
 One year probabilities of default results using the Merton and Hall and Miles approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MERTON DANSKE BANK DNB SHB NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK
Q2 2005 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2005 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2005 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2006 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2006 <0,01% 0,192% 0,117% 0,093% 0,130% 0,110%
Q3 2006 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2006 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2007 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,016% 0,078%
Q2 2007 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2007 0,010% <0,01% 0,015% 0,013% 0,502% 0,410%
Q4 2007 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,242% 0,315%
Q1 2008 0,713% 0,233% 0,612% 0,315% 1,468% 0,735%
Q2 2008 0,854% 0,254% 0,421% 0,127% 1,915% 1,212%
Q3 2008 2,517% 8,150% 1,503% 2,681% 6,684% 10,713%
Q4 2008 29,144% 21,709% 12,356% 16,420% 28,163% 26,142%
Q1 2009 19,092% 10,098% 6,432% 9,877% 21,640% 20,234%
Q2 2009 1,774% 4,459% 0,701% 1,782% 4,191% 7,645%
Q3 2009 0,095% 0,720% 0,136% 0,116% 0,898% 0,885%
Q4 2009 0,436% 0,727% <0,01% 0,052% 0,224% 0,189%
Q1 2010 <0,01% 0,030% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2010 1,667% 0,168% 0,018% 0,489% 0,782% 1,061%
Q3 2010 0,211% 0,042% <0,01% 0,015% 0,011% <0,01%
Q4 2010 0,014% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2011 0,306% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2011 0,096% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2011 2,374% 1,657% 0,331% 1,095% 2,655% 3,946%
Q4 2011 1,343% 1,968% 0,139% 1,453% 1,231% 0,947%
Q1 2012 0,064% 0,050% <0,01% <0,01% 0,022% 0,018%
Q2 2012 0,128% 0,732% <0,01% 0,059% 0,052% 0,018%
Q3 2012 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2012 0,025% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,039%
Q2 2013 0,086% 0,023% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2013 0,013% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
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HALL & MILES DANSKE BANK DNB SHB NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK
Q2 2005 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2005 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2005 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2006 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2006 <0,01% 0,092% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2006 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2006 0,016% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2007 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,035% 0,046%
Q2 2007 0,120% 0,064% <0,01% <0,01% 0,014% 0,020%
Q3 2007 0,140% 0,434% <0,01% <0,01% 0,013% <0,01%
Q4 2007 0,037% 0,828% 0,430% 0,103% 0,263% 0,273%
Q1 2008 0,437% 1,231% 0,132% 0,060% 0,219% 0,118%
Q2 2008 0,191% 0,064% 0,099% <0,01% 0,120% 0,081%
Q3 2008 0,627% 2,536% 0,048% 0,421% 6,326% 6,739%
Q4 2008 6,639% 15,377% 0,650% 2,317% 12,280% 14,765%
Q1 2009 2,798% 10,344% 1,675% 1,920% 9,047% 5,252%
Q2 2009 2,241% 4,728% 0,470% 0,956% 4,832% 7,278%
Q3 2009 0,046% 0,819% <0,01% <0,01% 0,182% 2,433%
Q4 2009 0,079% 0,643% <0,01% <0,01% 0,016% 0,081%
Q1 2010 0,014% 0,013% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2010 0,034% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% 0,017%
Q3 2010 0,012% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2010 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2011 0,166% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2011 0,028% 0,136% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2011 1,452% 0,760% 0,103% 0,183% 2,316% 2,957%
Q4 2011 0,218% 0,126% <0,01% <0,01% 0,016% 0,033%
Q1 2012 0,091% 0,161% <0,01% <0,01% 0,039% <0,01%
Q2 2012 0,014% 0,246% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2012 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2012 0,022% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q1 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q2 2013 <0,01% 0,012% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q3 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
Q4 2013 <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01% <0,01%
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Appendix 4: 
One year distance to default measures and graphs using the Merton and Hall and Miles approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MERTON DANSKE BANK DNB SHB NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK
Q2 2005 8,090 5,452 6,581 6,096 5,258 6,078
Q3 2005 8,770 6,220 7,172 7,833 5,828 8,345
Q4 2005 7,317 4,981 6,919 6,679 7,377 7,334
Q1 2006 6,758 6,571 5,725 6,418 5,364 4,915
Q2 2006 3,842 2,890 3,044 3,111 3,011 3,061
Q3 2006 6,883 4,692 6,244 4,737 4,878 5,692
Q4 2006 5,181 5,302 5,523 5,404 4,944 5,557
Q1 2007 6,222 4,804 4,852 5,090 3,599 3,165
Q2 2007 6,604 4,695 4,737 5,435 4,056 4,064
Q3 2007 3,709 4,537 3,616 3,659 2,575 2,643
Q4 2007 3,847 4,302 5,558 5,542 2,818 2,732
Q1 2008 2,451 2,829 2,505 2,731 2,179 2,440
Q2 2008 2,385 2,802 2,635 3,018 2,072 2,253
Q3 2008 1,957 1,395 2,169 1,930 1,500 1,242
Q4 2008 0,549 0,782 1,157 0,977 0,578 0,639
Q1 2009 0,875 1,276 1,519 1,289 0,784 0,833
Q2 2009 2,103 1,700 2,456 2,101 1,729 1,429
Q3 2009 3,106 2,447 2,999 3,045 2,366 2,372
Q4 2009 2,623 2,444 4,173 3,281 2,842 2,897
Q1 2010 3,933 3,435 6,019 4,678 4,199 4,423
Q2 2010 2,128 2,932 3,564 2,583 2,417 2,304
Q3 2010 2,861 3,342 4,029 3,610 3,684 4,063
Q4 2010 3,634 5,081 6,624 5,163 4,408 4,357
Q1 2011 2,742 4,394 5,133 3,779 4,424 4,500
Q2 2011 3,102 3,739 5,447 4,741 4,367 3,974
Q3 2011 1,982 2,130 2,715 2,292 1,934 1,757
Q4 2011 2,213 2,060 2,991 2,183 2,247 2,347
Q1 2012 3,221 3,291 3,994 3,804 3,513 3,569
Q2 2012 3,017 2,441 3,834 3,244 3,282 3,562
Q3 2012 4,018 3,969 5,373 4,793 4,385 5,309
Q4 2012 3,483 4,756 7,900 6,185 5,893 6,331
Q1 2013 3,981 3,828 4,442 4,512 4,863 3,357
Q2 2013 3,134 3,507 4,417 4,061 4,200 3,878
Q3 2013 3,648 4,748 5,918 4,749 5,308 4,633
Q4 2013 5,935 6,086 6,614 7,561 7,163 6,898
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HALL & MILES DANSKE BANK DNB SHB NORDEA SEB SWEDBANK
Q2 2005 5,343 4,609 5,959 5,616 5,484 5,465
Q3 2005 5,857 4,460 6,885 7,050 5,934 7,218
Q4 2005 6,363 3,998 5,607 6,746 7,721 7,740
Q1 2006 5,138 3,865 4,946 6,111 5,826 4,930
Q2 2006 4,165 3,114 4,644 4,113 3,939 4,069
Q3 2006 4,109 3,787 5,545 5,630 5,271 5,179
Q4 2006 3,596 4,490 5,584 5,060 4,425 5,118
Q1 2007 3,778 3,852 4,403 4,635 3,390 3,316
Q2 2007 3,035 3,222 3,958 4,793 3,634 3,539
Q3 2007 2,989 2,624 3,833 4,588 3,644 3,862
Q4 2007 3,376 2,396 2,627 3,081 2,791 2,778
Q1 2008 2,622 2,247 3,007 3,238 2,849 3,041
Q2 2008 2,893 3,220 3,094 3,848 3,035 3,154
Q3 2008 2,497 1,954 3,305 2,635 1,528 1,495
Q4 2008 1,503 1,020 2,484 1,992 1,161 1,047
Q1 2009 1,911 1,262 2,126 2,071 1,338 1,621
Q2 2009 2,006 1,672 2,597 2,343 1,661 1,455
Q3 2009 3,315 2,400 4,150 4,841 2,908 1,972
Q4 2009 3,159 2,487 4,883 4,452 3,603 3,152
Q1 2010 3,637 3,653 6,138 5,680 5,026 4,299
Q2 2010 3,397 4,019 4,845 3,881 4,206 3,585
Q3 2010 3,672 3,719 5,726 5,353 4,997 4,675
Q4 2010 3,947 4,919 5,076 5,461 4,985 5,521
Q1 2011 2,936 3,767 4,566 4,241 5,086 4,804
Q2 2011 3,448 2,997 4,096 4,559 5,091 4,460
Q3 2011 2,183 2,428 3,081 2,905 1,992 1,887
Q4 2011 2,852 3,021 4,608 4,906 3,598 3,402
Q1 2012 3,117 2,947 4,985 3,967 3,363 3,878
Q2 2012 3,629 2,812 4,191 4,026 3,983 4,102
Q3 2012 4,411 4,123 5,456 6,480 4,543 6,149
Q4 2012 3,517 4,334 7,126 6,789 6,143 5,863
Q1 2013 4,573 4,203 5,546 5,511 5,506 3,830
Q2 2013 3,957 3,663 4,726 4,448 4,850 4,009
Q3 2013 3,819 5,057 5,195 5,208 5,469 4,451
Q4 2013 5,798 5,361 6,888 7,336 6,815 6,464
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Appendix 5:  
Coefficients for 𝑋௤
௝,௜  regressions 
Xi   XNordea|Xi SEB HB Swedbank Danske DnB 
Nordea a   -0,060 -0,040 -0,060 -0,055 -0,065 
  B(Xi)   1,2014 0,657 0,949 0,591 0,702 
SEB a -0,042   -0,038 -0,052 -0,055 -0,069 
  B(Xi) 0,063   0,512 0,830 0,464 0,626 
HB a -0,044 -0,056   -0,064 -0,057 -0,068 
  B(Xi) 0,920 1,066   0,986 0,543 0,877 
Swedbank a -0,047 -0,053 -0,046   -0,059 -0,067 
  B(Xi) 0,573 0,906 0,507   0,389 0,573 
Danske a -0,058 -0,066 -0,052 -0,071   -0,066 
  B(Xi) 0,688 0,781 0,575 0,947   0,753 
DnB a -0,057 -0,062 -0,047 -0,067 -0,053   
  B(Xi) 0,604 0,677 0,528 0,713 0,497   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Appendix 6: 
1% ΔCoVaR with conditioning bank i on vertical axis and dependent bank j on horizontal axis 
 
2007-2009 
 
 
Nordea SEB HB Swedbank Danske DNB 
Nordea   -10,54% -6,46% -6,20% -6,04% -8,70% 
SEB -7,27%   -6,51% -10,31% -7,41% -9,33% 
HB -7,37% -8,71%   -6,88% -5,96% -9,13% 
Swedbank -5,60% -9,40% -4,33%   -3,14% -7,03% 
Danske -6,79% -9,07% -5,19% -8,35%   -6,62% 
DNB -8,21% -9,51% -8,90% -8,20% -7,56%   
 
 
2012-2013 
 
 
Nordea SEB HB Swedbank Danske DNB 
Nordea   -2,41% -1,45% -2,87% -2,38% -2,32% 
SEB -2,54%   -2,05% -4,72% -1,61% -1,64% 
HB -2,09% -1,85%   -2,85% -2,43% -1,65% 
Swedbank -1,83% -1,96% -2,23%   -1,79% -2,63% 
Danske -1,47% -1,63% -1,57% -1,37%   -2,51% 
DNB -0,92% -0,47% -0,12% -2,50% -1,59%   
 
 
